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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH, in the
interest
of

CASE NO.

16219

RICHARDS., a person
under eighteen years
of age.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the Findings and Conclusions and the Order entered on December 12, 1978,
by Judge L. Roland Anderson of the First Judicial District Juvenile Court for Weber County, State of Utah.
Specifically, appellant appeals the trial court's finding that he can be required to pay for damages sustained
by five motor vehicles when appellant was only convicted
of damaging one of the vehicles.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On September 8, 1978, a petition was filed
in the juvenile court charging appellant with unlawfully
entering one motor home with the intent to commit a
felony or a theft (Legal File 2).

On September 20,

1978, appellant was arraigned on this charge and entered
a plea of true.

As a result, the juvenile court re-
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committed appellant to the State Youth Development Center,
nunc pro tunc September 4, 1978 (Legal File 4).
On October 16, 1978, a second petition was
filed in the juvenile court charging appellant with four·
counts of intentionally damaging four motor homes (Legal
File 6).

Appellant denied these charges and trial was

set for November 21, 1978.

On that date the court

granted a preliminary motion made by appellant's counsel
and dismissed all four charges contained in the October
16th petition (Legal File 12).

However, on November

21, 1978 and December 12, 1978, the court held a restitution hearing and ruled that appellant could be ordered to pay for damages suffered by all five motor homes not only the one which appellant admitted damaging in
his September 20th arraignment, but also the four which
appellant was never convicted of having damaged (Legal
File 13).

Based on this finding of liability, the

court recommended to the State Youth Development Center
that payment of full restitution be made a condition
of appellant's parole (Legal File 17).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant asks this Court to reverse the
trial court's finding that he can be required to pay
restitution for damages suffered by five vehicles when
he admitted damaging one of them and all charges relating to damage to the other four vehicles were disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

missed.

Stemming from such a reversal, appellant also

asks this Court tonullifythe trial court's recommendation to the State Youth Development Center that payment
of restitution for all five vehicles be made a condition
of his parole from the institution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 16, 1978, five motor homes on the
premises of Freeway Mazda in Riverdale, Utah were
allegedly broken into and damaged.

Following police

investigation of the incident, the county attorney
filed a petition in juvenile court on September 8, 1978,
charging that "on or about the 16th day of August,
1978,

(appellant) did unlawfully enter a vehicle with

intent to commit a felony or theft therein, to-wit:
a motor home"

(Legal File 2).

On September 20, 1978,

appellant was arraigned on this charge and entered a
plea of true.

As a result of this plea, he was re-

committed to the State Youth Development Center (hereinafter State School) effective September 4, 1978.
The instant controversy began at the September
20th arraignment when the probation officer, Kathleen
weaver, attempted to make a recommendation to the court
as to the amount of restitution which appellant should
be required to pay.

She noted that five trailers had

been broken into on August 16th and that she was not
certain which one appellant had been charged with and
Sponsored
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a wide range in the amount of financial damages s·ustained
by the different trailers, she asked that the matter
of restitution be continued until she could make a
further investigation into which one of them appellant
had been charged with breaking into.
Ms. Weaver's subsequent attempts to determine
which vehicle appellant had been charged with damaging
apparently caused the county attorney to re-examine the
police report (Transcript. 10) and realize
vehicles were damaged on August 16th.

that five

Thus, on October

16th, a second petition, containing four individual
charges, was filed.

For each of the four charges, the

petition alleged that "on or about the 16th day of
August, 1978,

(appellant) did intentionally damage,

deface or destroy the property of Freeway Mazda, to-wit:
(a description of the individual vehicle), causing pecuniary loss less than $250.00."

Appellant was arraigned

on these charges on October 25th and denied any involvement with these four motor homes.

Trial was set

for November 21st, and disposition on the first petition
was continued to that date.
At the time set for trial, appellant's counsel
moved, pursuant to Section 76-1-402(2), Utah Code
Annotated (1973), to dismiss all four charges in the
October 16th petition.

This motion was based on the
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fact that whenever conduct establishes separate offenses
under a single criminal episode, and the offenses are
within the jurisdiction of a single court, and the
offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the
time the defendant is arraigned on the first charge,
the defendant shall not be subject to separate trials
for multiple offenses (Transcript 14 and 15).

The

county attorney admitted that the instant situation
was the type contemplated by the statute (see statements of Mr. Gladwell, Transcript. 15, and particularly
his admission "[i)nitially we ••• did have access to
all of the reports ••• ") but argued that the juvenile
court should not follow the statute in this instance.
The court did not agree with his argument, and ruled
that there was no question that the charges should
be dismissed (Transcript 17).

Hence all charges re-

lating to damages to the motor homes listed in the
October 16th petition were dismissed.
The reason this case is now before this Court
is that, after dismissing these charges, the trial
court went on to say that appellant could be held
liable for damages to all five motor homes.

(See

statements of the court on pages 17, 21, 28, 32 and
33 of Transcript, and on pages 13 and 17 of Legal File).
The court ruled this despite the fact that there was
no evidentiary hearing on whether appellant had caused
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

any damage to the four vehicles, and despite the fact
that the court was barred from considering any such
evidence, if it did exist, by the fact that the court
itself had just dismissed those charges.
Over repeated objections of appellant's
counsel that the court did not have the power to hold
him liable for damages to all five trailers (Transcript.
21, 26, 27, 31, 32) the court proceeded to conduct a
restitution hearing to determine the financial loss
suffered by each trailer.

Part of this hearing was

conducted on November 21st (Transcript 19-29).

The

remainder of the hearing was held on December 12, 1978,
in order to give Mr. Cutrubus, the owner of Freeway
Mazda, an opportunity to check with his insurance
company and determine the exact amount of loss (Transcript
31 and 32).
Again reaffirming its ruling that appellant
was legally responsible for damages to all five vehicles,
the court set a total restitution figure of $607.00
(Transcript 32).

The court then entered an order rec-

ommending that payment of the full $607.00 be made a
condition of appellant's parole when he is released from
the State School (Legal File 17).

His release from

the State School should occur sometime in the late
spring of 1979.
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES TO
FIVE MOTOR HOMES WHEN HE WAS ONLY
CONVICTED OF DAMAGING ONE.
The juvenile court's power to make restitution orders flows from the language of Section 78-la-39(7),
Utah Code Annotated (1953), which states that "(t]he
court may order that the child be required to repair
or replace or to otherwise make restitution for damage
or loss caused by his wrongful act ••. "

(Emphasis added.)

Thus the court does have the authority to require a child
who is under the court's jurisdiction to pay for losses
which are caused by acts which the child has either
admitted doing or has been convicted of doing.
Further understanding of the meaning of
restitution can be obtained by examining the adult
criminal code.

In setting forth the permissible con-

ditions of probation which a court can impose, Section
77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated (1953), states that the
defendant" ... may be required to make restitution or
reparation to the aggrieved party or parties for the
actual damages or losses caused by the offense to which
the defendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction
was had ... "(Emphasis added.)
Nowhere do either of these statutes permit a
court
to require an individual to pay for damages
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of that individual.

The court's action in the instant

case, in dismissing the charges that appellant damaged
the four motor homes and then going ahead and finding
that he is liable for the damages sustained by these
four vehicles, is clearly unwarranted and arbitrary,
and amounts to a violation of appellant's rights to
due process of law.

The United States Supreme Court,

pointing out that the due process clause is rule of
fairness that protects a citizen from arbitrary denial
of his rights, has consistently applied the due process
clause as a bar to arbitrary state action.
In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S.
100 (1960), the Court held that due process was denied
when a state convicted an individual without introducing any evidence.

In its decision, the Court cited

Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), in which it was
declared to be as much a violation of due process to
send an accused to prison following conviction on a
charge on which he was never tried as it would be to
convict him upon a charge that was never made.

Cole

involved convictions in a state court under §2 of a
statutue where on appeal to the state Supreme Court that
court affirmed a conviction based on §1 of the statute.
The United States Supreme Court held that such an
affirmance had the effect of convicting defendants
without a trial and was therefore a der1ial of procedural
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

There

would seem to be little difference between convictinq an
accused of a charge for which he was not tried and
the instant situation of finding that appellant can
be made to pay for damages to property he was not convicted of harming.
The net effect of the trial court's action
is that it has imposed multiple fines upon appellant
for his admission to the
trailer.

charg~

of having damaged one

Such action violates his rights to be free

from double jeopardy.
Breed v. Jones, 421
right to juveniles.)
Lange, 85 U.S.

(See amend. V,

u.s.

u.s.

Con3t; and

519 (1975), extending the double jeopardy

The Supreme Court, in Ex Parte

(18 Wall) 163 (1873), clearly pointed

out that the doctrine of double jeopardy prohibits
multiple punishments for a single offense.

Additionally,

the Court has noted that excessive penalties for a
single offense are also a denial of constitutional
rights.

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 143 (1907).

The

trial court has patently offended these principles by
finding that an individual guilty of damaging one
trailer should pay for damages to five trailers.

The

court's arbitrary action in punishing appellant for four
charges for which he was never convicted offends the
most fundamental notions of due process and fair play.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hence its ruling that appellant is legally responsible
for the full $607.00 in restitution should be reversed.
POINT

II

THE TRIAL COURT MISCONSTRUED THE CONCEPT
OF SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE WHEN IT USED
IT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR FINDING APPELLANT
RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO ALL FIVE MOTOR
HOMES.
The trial court attempted to justify its
finding that appellant is responsible for the damage
to all five vehicles by saying that because they were
apparently damaged in the same criminal episode, appellant should pay restitution on all of them.
script 32; Legal File 17).

(Tran-

The court applied this

reasoning despite the fact that five separate charges
were filed against appellant, one of which he admitted
and four of which were dismissed.

It is unclear exactly

why the court thought that the single criminal episode
statute supported this type of finding.
An examination of the single criminal episode
statute produces nothing which vindicates the manner
in which the trial court applied it.

Section 76-1-402(1),

Utah Code Annotated (1973) states:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal episode for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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provisions of the code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under any such provision bars
a prosecution under any other such
provision.
One of the primary purposes of this statute is to protect a defendant from being punished in several ways
for the commission of one wrongful act.

For example,

a defendant who pleads guilty to assault with a

deadly

weapon cannot also be prosecuted for the lesser included offense of simple assault.
P.2d 208 (Utah 1968).

State v. Hunter, '437

The statute does allow a defen-

dant to be prosecuted in one criminal action for each
separate offense he committed in the same criminal
episode.

State v. Eichler, 584 P.2d 861 (Utah 1978).
The single criminal episode statute does not

support the ruling of the trial court in the case at
bar.

It does not say that a defendant can be prosecuted

for one of the offenses which occurred in the criminal
episode and then found guilty of the rest of the offenses
without being charged with them.

Nor does it state that

an accused who admits one of the separate offenses,
following which the court dismisses charges for the other
offenses, can be held responsible for damages caused
by each of the separate offenses.

The court's use of

the single criminal episode theory assumes that a charged
offense and its concomitant penalty can be

separ~ted.
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The notion that a punishment can be imposed without
the supportive structure of an actual charge offends
essential requirements of due process.

Again, the

court's finding that appellant is responsible for any
losses over those sustained by the one motor home
which he admitted damaging is erroneous and should be
reversed.
POINT

III

BECAUSE APPELLANT WAS COMMITTED TO THE
STATE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER PRIOR
TO HIS RESTITUTION HEARING, THE ENTIRE
ISSUE OF RESTITUTION WAS BEYOND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT.
In addition

to the reasons discussed in

points one and two which mandate reversal of the trial
court's ruling, there is a

fundamental question as to

whether the court had the power to enter any form of
ruling on the issue of restitution.

This Court has

held that the juvenile court is a statutory court which
has only those powers specifically granted to it by the
Juvenile Court Act, Section 78-3a-l et. seq., Utah Code
Annotated.

R v. Whitmer, 515 P.2d 617 (Utah 1973).

Section 40(2) of that Act states that the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court terminates "upon commitment to
the state industrial school for an indeterminate period
in excess of 90 days."

That type of commitment order

was entered in this case at appellant's arraignment on
the first petition on September 20, 1978, to be effective
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nunc pro tunc September 4, 1978 (Legal File 4).

Thus,

after that date the juvenile court lost jurisdiction
over appellant.

It did not have the authority to hold

subsequent restitution hearings, nor to make the recommendation to the State School that payment of restitution be made a condition of appellant's parole.
The trial court, commenting on the issue of
jurisdiction, stated that the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction to determine restitution even after a youth
is committed to the State School (Transcript 17).

How-

ever, the language of Section 7B-3a-40(2) is absolute
when it discusses termination of the court's jurisdiction:

it does not provide for this type of partial

retention of jurisdiction.
Case law on the extent of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction in this situation is relatively limited.
It is helpful to review the following three cases for
the analogies they offer on the meaning of a juvenile
court's limited jurisdiction.
N

, 5JO S.W.2d

In In the Matter of A

284 (Mo. App. 1973), the court held

that an order suspending the commitment of a juvenile,
and placing him instead with his mother, was void and
beyond the statutory powers of the juvenile court.
statute

The

gave the juvenile court the power to commit

a child to an institution, or to place a child on home
probation, but not to do both at once.

Because the
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court's action was not specifically authorized by the
statute, it was invalid.

The court emphasized that

" ••• the juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may exercise only such powers as are conferred
by statute."

500 S.W.2d

at 287.

A more recent Missouri case

again affirms

this insistence that a juvenile court may only do those
things which it has been specifically authorized to do
by statute.

In State of Missouri ex rel B

Conley, 568 S.W.2ct

C

C

v.

608 (1978), the youth had been

committed to the state training school.

Because the

Missouri statute stated that such commitment terminated
the juvenile court's jurisdiction, the appellate court
ruled that the juvenile court could not make an order
affecting the youth unless jurisdiction was returned
to it in an appropriate proceeding.
One final case which is helpful to examine
is Matter of Appeal in Maricopa County, Etc., 572 P.2d
451 (Ariz. App. 1977).

There the issue was whether the

juvenile court had exceeded its statutory authority by
simultaneously ordering the juvenile committed to the
Department of Correction, suspending the commitment,
and continuing the juvenile on probation.

Because none

of the sections of the statute provided the court with
the power to enter such an order, the appellate court
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ruled the order void, noting that " ••• the power of the
juvenile court to make a particular disposition of a
delinquent child is limited in that it must be expressly granted by legislative act." 572 P.2d at 452.
Applying these principles to the instant case,
itappears that the trial court indeed lacked the
statutory authority to conduct the restitution hearing.

While Section 78-3a-39(7) allows a juvenile court

to make restitution orders, this section only applies
to those youths who are within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.

By virtue of Section 78-3a-40(2),

the juvenile court's jurisdiction over appellant terminated when he was committed to the State School on
September 20, 1978.

Thus the trial court had no power

to rule that appellant could be held legally responsible
for damages to each of the five motor homes.
Additionally, it was not within the trial
court's power to recommend to the State School that
payment of $607.00 in restitution be made a condition
of appellant's parole.

Aside from the above discussed

problem with the court even considering the restitution
issue, it is not within the province of the juvenile
court to determine conditions of parole.

For practical

purposes, a "recommendation" from the juvenile court
will be interpreted by the officials at the State School
as a directive with which they must comply.

Having to structure
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a juvenile's parole around a prior order of the court
will interfere with the ability to fashion a parole
contract around the particular needs of the juvenile
at the time he is released from the institution.

Such

interference is discordant with the rehabilitative
goals of the entire juvenile justice system.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is not legally responsible for
the damages sustained by five individual motor homes
when he only admitted damaging one of them.

All

charges relating to the other four vehicles were dismissed by the trial court.

The trial court is clearly

incorrect in stating that appellant is liable for all
losses solely because the five vehicles were damaged
in one criminal episode.

Damage to each of the trailers

was a separate criminal offense - appellant is only
responsible for one of those offenses.

For these

reasons, and for the more fundamental reason that the
trial court lost jurisdiction over appellant and did
not have the statutory authority to conduct a restitution
hearing, appellant respectfully asks this Court to
reverse the lower court's ruling that he is liable
for damages to the five motor homes.
DATED this

g -:J_

day of

¥Z:- _ fi

, 1979.
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